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Abstract
This paper analyzes the provision of local public goods with posi-
tive spillovers across jurisdictions. If spillovers are symmetric, the non-
cooperative game played by jurisdictions admits a unique equilibrium,
and an increase in spillovers reduces the total provision of public goods.
Smaller jurisdictions always reduce their contribution, but larger jurisdic-
tions can increase their contribution. When spillovers are asymmetric,
equilibrium is unique if spillovers are low, while multiple equilibria exist
for high spillover values. In the case of two jurisdictions, an increase in
the flow of spillovers to one jurisdiction benefits agents from that juris-
diction but harms agents in the other jurisdiction. Beyond the case of
two jurisdictions, the eﬀect of changes in spillovers cannot be signed. An
increase in the spillovers flowing to a jurisdiction can actually result in
an increase in the supply of public goods by that jurisdiction and harm
agents residing in it, while benefiting agents in the other jurisdictions.
The results of the paper reveal the complexity of interactions that will
plague the design of institutions for multijurisdictional local public good
economies with spillovers.
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1 Introduction
The provision of public goods is one of the prime applications of economic design.
Since the 1960’s, considerable eﬀorts have been expanded in designing rules and
institutions in order to elicit information about agents’ preferences for public
goods, or to encourage private contributions to public goods. For the most part,
the theoretical and empirical literature in economics has focused on two polar
models: the provision of pure public goods which benefit all agents, and the
provision of local public goods which only benefit agents in one community.
In this paper, we focus on the "intermediate" case, where agents are par-
titioned into communities, but enjoy positive spillovers from the public goods
provided in diﬀerent communities. Of course, the presence of spillovers across
jurisdictions has long been noted by economists. For example, suburban resi-
dents benefit from amenities provided in central cities; communities often build
joint infrastructures which benefit residents in all communities; in the case of
transfrontier pollution, countries benefit from pollution abatement programs of
other countries. In the late 1960’s, a series of theoretical studies on spillovers
((Williams, 66), Brainard and Dolbaer (1967), Boskin (1973)) culminated in
Oates (1972)’s study of fiscal federalism, which points out conditions under
which central provision of local public goods with spillovers should be preferred
to a decentralized system.1
The objective of this paper is to revisit the issue of local public provision with
spillovers using modern game-theoretic tools. Assuming that local governments
independently choose the level of public goods (or alternatively the propor-
tional tax rate), the provision of public goods results from the non-cooperative
equilibrium of a game played by jurisdictions. We analyze the properties of
this equilibrium, focussing on uniqueness and the comparative statics eﬀects of
changes in the structure of spillovers.2
1Following Oates (1972)’s seminal contribution, the literature on fiscal federalism has ex-
panded rapidly. For recent contributions emphasizing inter-jurisdictional spillovers, see Lock-
wood (2002), Besley and Coate (2003), Cremer and Palfrey (2003) and Redoano and Scharf
(2004).
2We emphasize that our analysis is primarily positive: we characterize equilibrium for a
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In order to fix ideas, consider the following problem. Residents in one com-
munity can benefit from amenities (restaurants, opera houses, museums, etc..)
oﬀered in diﬀerent communities. The intensity of spillovers reflects the trans-
portation costs to move across cities. The questions we raise are the following:
When is the amount of local public goods provided by diﬀerent communities
unique? Does a reduction in the transportation cost (either a uniform reduc-
tion, or a reduction for a specific city) aﬀect the amount of public goods and
the utility of residents in diﬀerent cities?
We first consider the case of symmetric spillovers, which are parametrized
by a single parameter α ∈ [0, 1] — with the understanding that residents in
one community only benefit from a fraction α of the public goods provided in
other communities. In this symmetric model, we show (adapting the well-known
argument of Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) and (1992)), that equilibrium
is always unique. Furthermore, an increase in the spillover parameter always
reduces the total provision of public goods. However, interestingly, an increase
in α does not necessarily reduce the provision of public goods in all communities.
We show that smaller communities will always reduce their provision of public
good (and also see their utility increase), but that larger jurisdiction can in
fact increase their supply of public goods, and be harmed by an increase in the
spillover parameter.
In the second part of the paper, we turn our attention to the general case,
where spillovers between jurisdictions are represented by a general matrix A =
[αij ]. We first show that when spillovers are low (i.e.
P
j 6=i αij < 1 for all i),
equilibrium is unique. For higher spillovers, the game of public good provision
can in fact exhibit multiple equilibria. In the general case, the level of public
good is determined by a complex interplay between the sizes of jurisdictions
and the spillover matrix, and the eﬀect of changes in spillovers are diﬃcult to
ascertain. In the specific case of two communities, we show that an increase in
fixed distribution of the population across jurisdictions and a general spillover structure. We do
not attempt to study normative implications of the model, and do not consider public policies
(such as inter-jurisdictional transfers or centralization) which could alleviate the ineﬃciencies
due to externalities.
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the flow of spillovers to one jurisdiction reduces the level of public good provision
of that jurisdiction, and raises the level of public good provision in the other.
This results in a higher utility for agents which have experienced an increase
in the spillover, but a lower utility for agents in the other jurisdiction. Beyond
the case of two jurisdictions, the eﬀect of changes in spillovers cannot be signed.
We provide an example to show that an increase in the spillovers flowing to a
jurisdiction can actually result in an increase in the supply of public goods of
that jurisdiction and harm agents residing in it (while benefiting agents in the
other jurisdictions).
Returning to our illustration, the results of the paper can thus be interpreted
as follows. Suppose that two cities (like Paris and Lyon in France, or Ankara and
Istanbul in Turkey) are linked by a new high speed train line. This amounts to a
global reduction in transportation costs between the two cities, and an increase
in the intensity of spillovers. Our results suggest that as a consequence, the
provision of public goods in the smaller jurisdictions (Ankara and Lyon) will
decrease, whereas the amount of public goods provided in the larger jurisdictions
(Paris and Istanbul) might go up. Residents in Ankara and Lyon will definitely
benefit from the new high speed train line, but residents in Paris and Istanbul
may be hurt.
Before we turn to the description of the model, we should note that our
specification (or variants of it) have already been used in diﬀerent contexts.
Lockwood (2002) considers a model with the same specification of spillovers,
but with discrete public projects, and analyzes fiscal federalism. Bjortvatn and
Schjelderup (2002) use the model with symmetric spillovers to analyze compe-
tition in capital taxes. In a companion paper, (Bloch and Zenginobuz (2004)),
we use the same model to analyze mobility across jurisdictions and characterize
Tiebout equilibria as a function of the spillovers across jurisdictions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next Section presents the
model and notations. Section 3 analyzes the game with symmetric spillovers.
Section 4 considers asymmetric spillovers, and Section 5 contains our conclu-
sions.
4
2 The Model
Agents and Jurisdictions
We consider an economy with a continuum of identical agents on the interval
[0, 1] with Lebesgue measure λ. There are n distinct fixed jurisdictions in the
economy, indexed by i = 1, 2, ..., n. An assignment of agents to jurisdictions is a
measurable mapping A : [0, 1]→ {1, 2, ..., n}. We define the distribution of the
population across jurisdictions by a vectorm in the n−1−dimensional simplex,
m ∈ ∆ = {(m1,m2, ...,mn),mi ≥ 0,
P
mi = 1} where mi = λ({a,A(a) = i})
denotes the fraction of the population living in jurisdiction i.
There are two goods in the economy: a private consumption good c and a
local public good provided within each jurisdiction. Each jurisdiction i chooses
the amount of total public goods, Gi in order to maximize the sum of utilities
of agents in that jurisdictions. (Because agents are identical, this is equivalent
to choosing a uniform tax rate ti on the consumption good). We depart from
traditional models of local public goods by assuming that there exist positive
spillovers across jurisdictions. Specifically, we suppose that spillovers are para-
metrized by a matrix A = [αij ] where 0 ≤ αij ≤ 1 denotes the spillovers from
jurisdiction i to jurisdiction j. We interpret αij as the degree of spillovers that
enable an agent in jurisdiction i to consume the local public good provided in
jurisdiction j. All spillovers are assumed to be positive and αii = 1 for all i.
The two special cases where αij = 0 for all i 6= j and αij = 1 for all i 6= j
correspond to the two polar cases of pure local public goods and pure public
goods respectively.
Local public goods provided in diﬀerent jurisdictions are taken to be perfect
substitutes, and we define the composite public good consumed by an agent in
jurisdiction i as
γi =
X
j
αijGj .
All agents share the same utility function over the private good and the
composite public good given by
u(c, γ)
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where u is is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing in both argu-
ments. We define the marginal rate of substitution of the consumption good for
the public good by
f(c, γ) =
uc(c, γ)
uγ(c, γ)
.
All agents are endowed with one unit of the private good, which can be trans-
formed into public goods through a linear production function. Letting g denote
the contribution of an agent to the local public good, we have c = 1 − g. We
assume the following property of the utility function.
Assumption 1 The utility function is concave in the private good. Both goods
are weakly normal, and one of the two goods is strongly normal.
Assumption 2 The function u satisfies the following boundary conditions: (i)
limγ→0 f(c, γ) = 0 for all c and (ii) limc→0 f(c,m) ≥ m for all m ∈ [0, 1].
Assumption 1 guarantees that the marginal rate of substitution f is nonin-
creasing in c and nondecreasing in γ. Strong normality of one of the two goods
guarantees that f is either decreasing in c (if the public good is strongly nor-
mal), or increasing in γ (if the consumption good is strongly normal). The
boundary conditions of assumption 2 guarantee that, in the case of pure local
public goods, any jurisdiction of size m chooses an interior level of public good
provision, G ∈ (0,m). As all agents are identical, and the utility function is
concave in the private good, eﬃcient provision of local public goods requires
that all agents inside the same jurisdiction i provide the same amount gi and
Gi =
Z
a,A(a)=i
gidλ = migi
Hence the utility of an agent in jurisdiction i can be rewritten (in an indirect
form) as:
u(1− Gi
mi
,
X
j
αijGj).
Equilibrium
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We suppose that jurisdiction sizes are fixed, and consider the noncooperative
game played across jurisdictions. We first define a Nash equilibrium of the
noncooperative game.
Definition 1 An equilibrium is a vectorG in <n+ satisfying: Gi ∈ argmaxu(1−
Gi
mi
,
P
j αijGj) for all i .
Our first result shows that, under Assumption A1, the noncooperative game
always admits a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, and provides a characterization
of equilibrium in terms of first order conditions.
Proposition 1 Let the utility function satisfy Assumptions A1 and A2. Then
the game of public good provision admits a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Fur-
thermore, jurisdiction i’s equilibrium public good provision is characterized by
the first order condition:
f(1− Gi
mi
, γi) = mi
or
Gi = 0 and f(1, γi) ≥ mi
Proof. We first note that, given that jurisdiction i can at most invest its total
endowment, mi, in the public good, the strategy spaces are compact intervals,
Si = [0,mi]. Furthermore, we can characterize the best response function of
jurisidiction i by considering the derivative of the indirect utility with respect
to Gi,
du
dGi
= − 1
mi
uc(1−
Gi
mi
,
X
j
αijGj) + uγ(1−
Gi
mi
,
X
j
αijGj).
Normality of the two goods (Assumption A1) guarantees that, at the optimum,
d2u
dG2i
= (
1
mi
)2ucc −
2
mi
ucγ + uγγ
= (
1
uc
)2(u2γucc − 2ucuγucγ + u2cuγγ) < 0.
Hence, the indirect utility is strictly quasi-concave in Gi and continuous in
Gj , guaranteeing the existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies. Further-
more, this equilibrium is characterized by the best response functions of the
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jurisdictions which are equivalent to the (necessary and suﬃcient) first-order
conditions.
Quasi-Linear Utility Functions
Equilibrium can easily be computed for the class of quasi-linear utility func-
tions where
u(c, γ) = c+ v(γ)
with v0(γ) > 0 and v00(γ) < 0. The boundary conditions are then given by : (i)
limγ→0 v0(γ) =∞ and (ii) 1 ≥ mv0(m) for all m ∈ (0, 1).
Let µi denote the level of public good provision of jurisdiction i in the absence
of spillovers,
µi = (v
0)−1
µ
1
mi
¶
As v00(.) is strictly decreasing, µi is well defined and the boundary conditions
guarantee that µi belongs to the interval [0,mi]. The best-response function of
jurisdiction i can then be computed as
Gi = max{µi −
X
j 6=i
αijGj, 0}
and the equilibrium level of public good provision is obtained at a fixed point
of the best-response mapping assigning a best response to every jurisdiction.
3 Symmetric spillovers
In this Section, we suppose that for all i 6= j, αij = αji = α. Spillovers are
symmetric and parametrized by a single value α ∈ [0, 1]. Our first result shows
that, in that case, the equilibrium level of public good provision is unique.
Proposition 2 Let the utility function satisfy Assumption A1 (with the public
good being strongly normal if α = 1.) Then the equilibrium level of public good
provision, G is unique.
Proof. Suppose that there exist two distinct equilibria G and G0 and without
loss of generality suppose that G1 > G01. We first show that this implies γ1 ≤ γ01.
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In fact, suppose by contradiction that γ1 > γ
0
1. By Assumption A1,
f(1− G1
m1
, γ1) > f(1−
G01
m1
, γ01),
contradicting the fact that G1 and G01 satisfy the first order condition, with
G1 > G01. As γ1 ≤ γ01 and G1 > G01, there must exist another jurisdiction, say
jurisdiction 2 for which G02 > G2. The same line of argument then shows that
γ02 ≤ γ2. The two inequalities in γ can be developed as:
G1 + αG2 + α
X
j>2
Gj ≤ G01 + αG02 + α
X
j>2
G0j
G02 + αG
0
1 + α
X
j>2
G0j ≤ G2 + αG1 + α
X
j>2
Gj .
Adding the two inequalities and rearranging, we obtain:
(1− α)(G1 −G01) ≤ (1− α)(G2 −G02)
If α < 1, this implies that
0 < G1 −G01 ≤ G2 −G02 < 0
a contradiction.
If α = 1, the inequalities imply:
γ1 = γ
0
1.
If the public good is strongly normal, f is strictly decreasing in c and hence,
f(1− G1
m1
, γ1) > f(1−
G01
m1
, γ01),
contradicting the fact that G1 and G01 satisfy the first order condition, with
G1 > G01.
Proposition 2 shows that when spillovers are symmetric, equilibrium is unique.
The only exception is the case of pure public goods and quasi-linear utility func-
tions, where the total value of public good provision is uniquely determined, but
the distribution across jurisdictions is arbitrary. The proof of Proposition 2 is
reminiscent of the proof of uniqueness of equilibrium in the model of pure public
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good provision (Bergstrom, Blume and Varian, 1992). As in the case of private
provision of public goods, the proof relies heavily on the normality of the two
goods. We also note that the fact that spillovers are symmetric plays a crucial
role in the proof of the Proposition.
For a fixed level of spillovers, we can easily show that larger jurisdictions
always provide a higher amount of local public goods. Again, this result is not
surprising as it parallels well-known arguments in the case of local public goods
and pure public goods.
Lemma 1 Consider two jurisdictions with mi > mj. Then, in equilibrium,
Gi ≥ Gj.
Proof. Suppose that mi > mj and Gj > Gi. Using the first order condition,
f(1− Gi
mi
, γi) ≥ mi > mj ≥ f(1−
Gj
mj
, γj)
However, 1 − Gi/mi > 1 − Gj/mj and γi = Gi + αGj + α
P
k 6=i,j Gk < γj =
Gj + αGi + α
P
k 6=i,j Gk. As f is nonincreasing in c, nondecreasing in γ, and
one of the two goods is strongly normal, we have
f(1− Gi
mi
, γi) < f(1−
Gj
mj
, γj),
yielding a contradiction.
3.1 Changes in the spillover parameter
We now analyze the eﬀects of changes in the spillover parameter α on the
provision of pulbic goods, and derive the main results of the paper. Our first
Proposition shows that an increase in the spillover parameter reduces the total
provision of public goods, and necessarily increases the utility of agents in some
jurisdiction.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the utility function satisfies A1. Then, if α0 > α,
the total amount of public goods provided satisfies G =
P
iGi ≥ G
0
=
P
iG
0
i.
10
Proof. Consider two spillover parameters with α0 > α and let G and G
0
denote
the corresponding total levels of public good provision. Suppose by contradiction
that G
0
> G. Then there exists a jurisdiction i for which G0i > Gi. From the
first order conditions:
f(1− G
0
i
mi
, (1− α0)G0i + α0G
0
) ≤ f(1− Gi
mi
, (1− α)Gi + αG).
But, as 1 − G
0
i
mi
< 1 − Gimi and the two goods are normal, this implies that
(1 − α0)G0i + α0G
0 ≤ (1 − α)Gi + αG, contradicting the assumptions G0i > Gi
and G
0
> G.
Proposition 3 shows that the total provision of public goods decreases with an
increase in the spillover parameter. It does not show however that the provision
of public goods decreases for all jurisdictions. The next results will help us
identify those jurisdictions for which public good provision decreases.
Proposition 4 Suppose that utilities satisfy Assumption A1 and A2. Then, if
mi < mj and α0 > α, if G0j ≤ Gj then G0i ≤ Gi.
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that G0j ≤ Gj and G0i > Gi. First consider
the case G0j < Gj . Then, by the first order condition:
f(1− Gj
mj
,Gj + α
X
k 6=j
Gk) ≤ f(1−
G0j
mj
, G0j + α
0X
k 6=j
G0k)
Given that G0j < Gj , and that the two goods are normal, this implies that
G0j + α
0X
k 6=j
G0k ≥ Gj + α
X
k 6=j
Gk.
Similarly, as G0i > Gi,
Gi + α
X
k 6=i
Gk ≥ G0i + α0
X
k 6=i
Gk
Summing up these inequalities,
Gi +G
0
j + α
0G0i + αGj ≥ Gj +G0i + α0G0j + αGi
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or
(1− α0)(G0j −G0i) ≥ (1− α)(Gj −Gi).
Given thatmi < mj , by Proposition 1, Gj−Gi ≥ 0 and G0j−G0i ≥ 0. As α0 > α,
(1− α0) < (1− α). Hence, the preceding inequality implies:
(G0j −G0j) ≥ (Gj −Gi),
contradicting the assumptions: G0j < Gj and G
0
i > Gi.
Suppose now that G0j = Gj . If this is an interior solution, the first order
conditions guarantee that:
G0j + α
0X
k 6=j
G0k = Gj + α
X
k 6=j
Gk
and the same argument can be applied. If G0j = Gj = 0, as mi < mj , Gi =
G0i = 0 and the result follows. Finally, the boundary condition of Assumption
A2 guarantees that Gj = G0j = mj cannot hold at equilibrium.
Proposition 4 shows that, if the public good provision of some jurisdiction i
decreases, then necessarily the public good provision of all smaller jurisdictions
must decrease. In particular, as the total public good provision always decreases,
the public good provision of the smallest jurisdiction cannot increase. We
now turn to equilibrium utilities and show that there exists a direct connection
between changes in the provision of public goods and changes in utilities.
Proposition 5 Suppose that the utility function satisfies Assumption A1. Let
α0 6= α. Then, U 0i < Ui if G0i > Gi and U 0i > Ui if G0i < Gi.
Proof. Suppose that G0i > Gi. From the first order condition, we have:
f(1− G
0
i
m0i
, G0i + α
0X
j 6=i
G0j) ≤ f(1−
Gi
mi
, Gi + α
X
j 6=i
Gj).
As G0i > Gi and the two goods are normal, this implies that:
Gi + α
X
j 6=i
Gj ≥ G0i + α0
X
j 6=i
G0j
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and hence
α
X
j 6=i
Gj > α
0X
j 6=i
G0j .
Now, u(1− Gimi ,Gi+α
P
j 6=iGj) ≥ u(1−
G0i
mi
, G0i+α
P
j 6=iGj) > u(1−
G0i
mi
, G0i+
α0
P
j 6=iG
0
j). The same argument can be applied for G
0
i < Gi.
Proposition 5 thus show that a decrease in the provision of public goods by
some jurisdiction is associated with an increase in the utility of agents belonging
to that jurisdiction. By Proposition 3, this shows that an increase in the spillover
parameter cannot result in a decrease in utility for all agents. Proposition 4
furthermore shows that agents in the smallest jurisdiction cannot suﬀer a utility
loss if the spillover paramer increases. In fact, if the provision of public goods
in the smallest jurisdiction goes down, agents in the smallest jurisdiction always
benefit from the increase in the spillover parameter.
We summarize our results as follows. Agents belonging to smaller jurisdic-
tion typically experience a decrease in the provision of public goods and an
increase in utility when the spillover paramer increases. Agents in larger ju-
risdiction may in fact provide more public goods and suﬀer from a utility loss
with an increase in spillovers. We now illustrate these eﬀects by characterizing
completely equilibrium in a model with two jurisdictions and quasi-linear utility.
Two Jurisdictions and Quasilinear Utilities
We consider two jurisdictions, with m1 ≤ m2. In an interior equilibrium,
G1 =
(µ1 − αµ2)
1− α2 , G2 =
(µ2 − αµ1)
1− α2 ,
This equilibrium exists as long as α < µ1µ2 < 1. In that interior equilibrium, we
easily compute:
∂Gi
∂α
=
2αµi −
¡
1 + α2
¢
µj
(1− α2)2
, i 6= j,
As 2αµ1 −
¡
1 + α2
¢
µ2 < 0, the provision of public good of jurisdiction 1 is
always decreasing in α, and the equilibrium utility increasing. For agents in
the larger jurisdiction, the provision of public good is decreasing if and only if
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µ1
µ2
≤ 2α1+α2 ≤ 1, and increasing otherwise. A simple computation shows that
µ1
µ2
≤ 2α1+α2 if and only if α ≤
µ2
µ1
h
1−
q
1− (µ1µ2 )
2
i
.
If α > µ1µ2 , in equilibrium, jurisdiction 2 is the only jurisdiction providing
the public good, so G2 = µ2 and G1 = 0 for all α. In that case, the equilibrium
utility of agents in jurisdiction 2 is constant, and the equilibrium utility of agents
in jurisdiction 1 is increasing in α. We summarize these findings in the following
Proposition.
Proposition 6 Suppose that utilities are quasi-linear and satisfy Assumptions
A1 and A2, and let n = 2 with m1 ≤ m2. If α ≤ µ2µ1
h
1−
q
1− (µ1µ2 )
2
i
, then
G1 and G2 are both decreasing in α, and U1 and U2 are increasing in α. If
µ2
µ1
h
1−
q
1− (µ1µ2 )
2
i
≤ α ≤ µ1µ2 , then G1 is decreasing in α but G2 increasing,
and U1 is increasing in α and U2 decreasing. If α ≥ µ1µ2 , jurisdiction 2 is the
only jurisdiction providing the public good, G1 and G2 are independent of α,
and U1 is increasing in α and U2 independent of α.
The following example illustrates Proposition 6.
Example 1 Let n = 2,m1 = 1/3,m2 = 2/3 and u(c, γ) = c+ log γ .
One can easily compute:µ1µ2 = 1/2 and
µ2
µ1
h
1−
q
1− (µ1µ2 )
2
i
= 2−
√
3. The
following graph shows the provision of public good of jurisdictions 1 and 2 for
α ∈ [0, 1/2].
The solid line represents the public good contribution of jurisdiction 2 (the
larger jurisdiction) and the dashed line the public good provision of jurisdiction
1 (the smaller jurisdiction). For jurisdiction 1, the provision of public good is
strictly decreasing in α and utility strictly increasing in α.For jurisdiction 2, the
provision of public good is first decreasing for α ∈ [0, 2−
√
3], then increasing for
α ∈ [2−
√
3, 1/2]. The utility of agents in jurisdiction 2 is thus first increasing
in α, then decreasing in α.
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Figure 1: Public good provision in two jurisdictions
4 Asymmetric Spillovers
In this Section, we consider the general case where spillovers are given by an
arbitrary matrix A. We first distinguish between two types of asymmetries.
First, for a given pair of jurisdictions, the flows of spillovers may be asymmetric,
αij 6= αji. Second, even if spillovers are symmetric for any pair of jurisdictions,
spillovers may be diﬀerent across diﬀerent pairs, αij 6= αkl for k, l 6= i, j. It
is useful to define a partial order on jurisdictions, in order to determine which
jurisdictions benefit more from spillovers.
Definition 2 A jurisdiction i is more central than a jurisdiction j if and only
if αik ≥ αjk for all k 6= i, j and αik > αjk for some k 6= i, j.
Our first task is to analyze conditions under which the equilibrium level of
public good provision is unique. The following Proposition provides a suﬃcient
condition for uniqueness of equilibrium.
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Proposition 7 Suppose that utility functions satisfy Assumption A1 and thatP
j 6=i αij < 1 for all i. Then the equilibrium level of public good provision, G,
is unique.
Proof. We show that when
P
j 6=i αij < 1 for all i, the best-response mapping
is a contraction. To this end, recall that the best response of a jurisdiction i is
given by:
φi(G−i) = arg max
Gi∈[0,mi]
ui(1−
Gi
mi
, Gi +
X
αijGj).
Using the first-order condition
φi(G−i) = 0 if f(1,
P
αijGj) ≥ 0,
or φi(G−i) = mi if f(0,mi +
P
αijGj) ≤ mi
or φi(G−i) s.t. f(1− Gimi ,
P
αijGj) = mi
The best response mapping φi is diﬀerentiable everywhere except at the two
points where f(1,
P
αijGj) = 0 and f(0,mi +
P
αijGj) = mi, where the left
hand side and right hand side derivatives may be diﬀerent. This will not aﬀect
the argument, and at these two points, we define the derivative to be the right
hand side and left hand side derivatives, respectively. If the best response is a
corner point (φi(G−i) = 0 or φi(G−i) = mi), ∂φi/∂Gj = 0 for all j so thatX
j 6=i
∂φi
∂Gj
= 0 < 1
At interior best responses, we compute:
∂φi
∂Gj
=
αijfγ
−fc/mi + fγ
Hence, X
j 6=i
∂φi
∂Gj
=
P
j 6=i αijfγ
−fc/mi + fγ
> −1
This computation shows that in the Hessian matrix of cross-derivatives, all oﬀ-
diagonal terms are dominated by the diagonal terms — the dominant diagonal
condition holds. This is a suﬃcient condition for the best-response mapping to
be a contraction (see, for example Vives (2000), p. 48), and the equilibrium is
unique.
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Proposition 7 shows that when the spillover parameters are suﬃciently low,
the equilibrium level of public good provision is unique. If there are only two
jurisdictions and the good is not a pure public good (αij , αji < 1), this result
demonstrates that equilibrium is always unique. However, in general, one can-
not expect that the economy admits a unique equilibrium level of public good
provision. The following example, using three jurisdictions, shows that multiple
equilibria can exist.
Example 2 Let n = 3, u(c, γ) = c+log γ, m1 < m2 < m3 with m3 < m1+m2.
A =
⎡
⎣
1 0 α
0 1 α
α α 1
⎤
⎦
We show that for α close to 1, there exist two distinct equilibria, with dif-
ferent levels of public good provision.
Equilibrium 1 : All jurisdictions contribute. The contributions are given by
the solutions to the system of equations:
G1 + αG3 = m1,
G2 + αG3 = m2,
αG1 + αG2 +G3 = m3.
We can easily compute:
G1 =
αm3 − α2m2 − (1− α2)m1
2α2 − 1
G2 =
αm3 − α2m1 − (1− α2)m2
2α2 − 1
G3 =
αm2 + αm1 −m3
2α2 − 1
For α = 1, all contributions are positive, as G1 = m3−m2 > 0, G2 = m3−m1 >
0 and G3 = m1+m2−m3 > 0. As the contributions are continuous in α, there
exists α < 1 such that all contributions are positive for α ≥ α. Note that in
this equilibrium,
G = G1 +G2 +G3 =
(2α− 1)m3 − (1− α)(m1 +m2)
2α2 − 1
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Equilibrium 2: Jurisdiction 3 is the only one to contribute. In that case,
G03 = m3
and as long as αm3 > m2 > m1, neither members of jurisdictions 1 and 2
choose to contribute. We note that these two equilibria are not equivalent in
terms of total contribution to the public good. One can easily show that for
α ∈
³
1
2
m1+m2
m3
, 1
´
G =
(2α− 1)(m3 + (1− α)(m1 +m2))
2α2 − 1 > m3 = G
0
.
Example 2 is interesting because it shows that multiple equilibria can exist
when the level of spillovers is high enough (
P
αij > 1), and spillovers are
asymmetric (αij 6= αik). In this example, the interior equilibrium (equilibrium
1) is unique, and the multiplicity stems from the fact that the game admits both
an inteiror and a corner equilibrium.
While the previous example shows that multiple equilibria may exist, we
now investigate whether, for a given equilibrium, the level of public good pro-
vision can be ranked according to the size of jurisdictions and the structure of
spillovers. When spillovers are symmetric, Lemma 1 shows that larger jurisdic-
tions provide more public goods. With asymmetric spillovers, this need not be
the case. In fact, Example 2 shows that larger jurisdictions may provide less
public goods. Ifm3 > m1+m2/2, then for α close enough to 1, G3 < G2. When
spillovers are asymmetric, contributions to the public good depend on the com-
plex interplay between jurisdiction sizes and the spillovers. If jurisdictions have
equal size, the following Lemma provides a partial ranking for the contributions
to the public good.
Lemma 2 Suppose that mi = mj and jurisdiction i is more central than juris-
diction j, then at any equilibrium Gi ≤ Gj.
Proof. Let mi = mj , αik ≥ αjk for all k 6= i, j and αik > αjk for some k.
Suppose by contradiction that Gi > Gj . Then from the first order condition,
f(1− Gj
mj
, γj) ≥ mj = mi ≥ f(1−
Gi
mi
, γi).
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However, 1−Gj/mj > 1−Gi/mi and γj = Gj +αjiGi+
P
k 6=i,j αjkGk < γi =
Gi + αijGj +
P
k 6=i,j αikGk. Hence, by normality of the two goods,
f(1− Gj
mj
, γj) < f(1−
Gi
mi
, γi)
contradicting the previous inequality.
Lemma 2 captures a very simple intuition. If two jurisdictions have equal
size, but one benefits more from the public goods provided in other jurisdictions,
the jurisdiction which is more centrally located contributes less public goods.
4.1 Changes in the spillover parameter
We now consider the eﬀect of changes in spillovers in the asymmetric case. We
start the analysis with the case of two jurisdictions, with asymmetric spillover
flows. We suppose that the change only aﬀects the spillover flow in one direction.
Proposition 8 Let n = 2 . Suppose that the utility function satisfies Assump-
tion A1 and that α0ij > αij. Then G
0
i ≤ Gi,G0j ≥ Gj , U 0i ≥ Ui and U 0j ≤ Uj.
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that G0i > Gi. From the first order condition,
f(1− Gi
mi
,Gi + αijGj) ≥ f(1−
G0i
mi
, G0i + α
0
ijG
0
j).
By a familiar argument, this implies that
Gi + αijGj ≥ G0i + α0ijG0j
Hence, Gj > G0j and similarly we obtain:
G0j + αjiG
0
i ≥ Gj + αjiGi.
Summing up these two inequalities, we obtain:
0 > (Gi −G0i)(1− αji) ≥ Gj(1− αij)−G0j(1− α0ij) > (1− α0ij)(Gj −G0j) > 0,
yielding a contradiction. Hence, G0i ≤ Gi. Notice that similarly, if Gj > G0j ,
then G0i > Gi and hence, the same argument shows that G
0
j ≥ Gj . Finally, the
argument of Lemma 5 can be used to show that U 0i ≥ Ui and U 0j ≤ Uj .
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Proposition 8 establishes that an increase in the flow of spillovers to juris-
diction i reduces the public good contribution of that jurisdiction, and increases
the public good provision of the other jurisdiction. This result is easy to inter-
pret. An increase in αij results in a decrease in the entire best response function
of jurisdiction i, while it leaves the best response function of jurisdiction j un-
changed. Hence, in equilibrium, the public good contribution of jurisdiction i
must go down. As best response functions are donward sloping, jurisdiction j
necessarily reacts by increasing its public good contribution. We note that this
change always results in an increase in the utility of jurisdiction i and a decrease
in the utility of jurisdiction j. This last eﬀect, while resting on a solid economic
intuition, is somewhat puzzling, as one may expect that an increase in spillover
flows always results in a better situation for all agents.
Unfortunately, the result of Proposition 8 cannot be extended beyond two
jurisdictions. The following simple example shows that an increase in αij can
actually result in an increase in the provision of public good of jurisdiction i if
one considers more than two jurisdictions.
Example 3 Let n = 3, u(c, γ) = c + log γ,m1 = m,m2 = m3 = 1−m2 , A =⎡
⎣
1 α 1
1 1 0
1 0 1
⎤
⎦ with (1−m)(α+ 1) > 2m > 1−m.
There exists an interior equilibrium where
G1 =
(1−m)(α+ 1)− 2m
2α
,
G2 = G3 =
2m− (1−m)
2α
One can easily check that an increase in α leads to a decrease in G2 and G3 and
an increase in G1.
Example 3 thus shows that the eﬀect of an increase in the flow from juris-
diction 2 to jurisdiction 1 depends on the entire structure of spillovers. The
presence of a third jurisdiction increases the complexity of the interaction, and
it is in general impossible to sign the eﬀect of changes in spillovers with general
spillover matrices.
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5 Conclusion
The analysis of this paper highlights the complex interaction between jurisdic-
tion sizes and the matrix of spillovers in the determination of equilibrium. This
complexity was already noted by Williams (1966, p. 19) who wrote:
In a setting in which local governments are left free to make their own
independent decisions about the supply of public goods, the complex
interactions that occur even in highly simplified situations make it
impossible to predict a priori whether undersupply or oversupply
will generally result.
In spite of this complexity, our analysis gives rise to a few very simple ob-
servations. First, the model with symmetric spillovers isolates the role of ju-
risdiction sizes in the determination of equilibrium, and shows that larger ju-
risdictions, which provide more public goods, are more prone to increase their
provision when the spillover parameter increases. The main message from the
model with general spillovers is that multiple equilibria are likely to emerge,
and that the eﬀect of an increase in spillovers on the provision of public goods
of one jurisdiction depends on the entire structure of spillovers.
We are aware of the fact that our model rests on several limitative assump-
tions. We suppose that public goods provided in diﬀerent jurisdictions are per-
fect substitutes and focus attention on positive spillovers; we assume away inter-
jurisdictional transfers and consider that the objective of every jurisdiction is to
maximize the utility of its members. We also assume that preferences of
agents are homogeneous and they have identical incomes. We believe
that a richer model, where some of these assumptions are relaxed, deserves fur-
ther study. In particular, altough it will complicate the analysis considerably,
relaxing the preference and/or income homogenity assumption in a tractable
manner will allow addressing questions regarding how spillovers across
jurisdictions may affects stratification (sorting) of agents into different
jurisdictions according to their preferences and/or income.
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